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BADLANDS IN AN APPELLATE JUDGE'S REALM OF REASON t
By ROGER J. TRAYNOR*

It is an honor to inaugurate the lecture series in my native state in memory
of one of its great teachers, William Henry Leary, Dean of the School of Law
of the University of Utah from 1915 until his retirement in 1950. It is recorded
in a University memoriam to him that during his deanship "the fledgling law
school grew to top accreditation with the Association of American Law Schools
and the Section of Legal Education of the American Bar Association." The
memoriam records also, and only then do we understand how heroic was this
accomplishment, that "great misfortune befell him and his family .*.0. ." A
first wife died and later a second while their children were still young. He
knew also the grief of losing two children. A single line evokes a life that
quietly surmounted disaster: "By his patience and resolute faith and the enlisted assistance of the older children, Dean Leary was remarkably successful
in rearing and educating his three sons and three daughters."
As his children and his law school were coming of age, Dean Leary found
little time for conventional social life. It was perhaps his very involvement
as parent and teacher that led naturally and without conflict of interest to
his increasingly wide involvement in community affairs and in legal groups
even after his retirement. Dedication he brought to these tasks, lightened
with pungent humor.
His was the daily responsibility of developing in students the ability to
reason. He knew also that beyond the precise alignment of issues as square
pegs or round or octagonal, lawyers have a job to do on the large issue of
whether our legal system is working as well, which is to say justly, or even as
systematically as it should.
We can pay him no more appropriate honor tonight than to consider one
aspect of that problem, the recurring badlands in an appellate judge's realm
of reason. For the most part the lonely judges wander the badlands resignedly,
discouraged at their extent but deterred by work or temperament from calling
for true amici curiae to come see for themselves the rough areas. We need
not linger on the obvious pleasantry that any court could do with a few friends,
centered as it is between lawyers convinced that it never read their briefs and
commentators convinced that it read them all wrong. Though its isolation is
rendered less than splendid by plainsongs of grumbling and arias of scholarly
agony, a well-tempered court can still hear the counterpoint of genial declarations that the court must have read the briefs, else how did declarants win,
and an occasional discreetly approving warble from the reserved section of
t Speech delivered as First Annual William H. Leary Lecture in Salt Lake City on November 10, 1960.
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California.
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scholarly judge-watchers that it has soundly resolved the issues, broken only
by a querulous note that the court need not have gone so far as it did to
redress the Sliding Rule Against Ambiguities.
The alternating currents of criticism and cautious approval tend to reinforce a court's independence. There remains nevertheless the hazard in too
many cases that though its judgment may be independent, it may also be illinformed. Everywhere but in the sorely tried courts we are retooling to meet
the fierce complexities of the Gliding if not Soaring Sixties. Only in the
judicial workshops is there still piecework by candlelight.
Even should judges be provided with staffs of ingenious electronic servants
to serve them up answers on conventional research problems, they could
hardly phrase their questions with such invariable skill as always to hit the
jackpot. The servants are no better than their masters who start them off on
their errands; they return only with what they have been asked to fetch. Moreover they are likely to become hysterical if questioned, not in well-documented
areas of the law in which they can fetch happily back to the Year Books, but
in the badlands where all traces of the past have become incomprehensible
in the eroded land. Amid this bleak landscape a judge sits independent and
ignorant, sadder if no wiser than ever before that his fellows in town and in
academic groves, who labor mightily on one case or one subject, expect him
to be not only a skillful jack-of-all-trades but an ace on the holes in the law.
A public bedazzled by vistas of electronic servants that will perform menial
mental tasks is apt to grow complacent that in the judicial process they will
somehow see all issues, heed all arguments, and speak at last the golden words
of ratio decidendi. We who know that the legal mind of a machine may be
even more mechanical than that of a lawyer or judge who digs only tried and
half-true formulas must still inquire whether we should not do much more to
clarify and improve the appellate process upon which we depend for articulation of the law.
Many still seem to believe there is a touchstone for precedent that reveals
the magic words for decision, which can then be stirred like instant coffee
into the colorless fluid of an opinion. Such ignorance is a serious hangover
from the sophomoric lightheartedness that recently produced in my university
town a large poster emblazoned: Help Stamp Out Reality. It is part of growing up to have a hard time coming to terms with reality. But adults trained
to think realistically should not forever shy away from the facts of life.
Is there effective communication among judges and lawyers in practice
and in law schools on the orderly development of the law? How many lawyers ever give it a thought? How much are the full-time professors doing to
give it direction? How many judges are giving impetus to legal concepts appropriate to our century?
How many lawyers have any real awareness of how courts arrive at a
decision? The process is one that should concern them, since they must reason
in advising and representing clients much as a judge does except for their
adversary emphasis. Perhaps we can clarify the routes to decision with a
travelogue illustrating the badlands in an appellate judge's realm of reason.
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Our first slide, showing only its conventional contours of stare decisis and
not its rough topography, fails to reveal that it is hardly a tidy realm. Our
second is likewise unrevealing: it is a chart showing that courts invoke readily
available and singularly appropriate precedents for the disposition of the great
mass of appeals. This chart does not concern us here except to indicate how
numerous are the specious intruders wasteful of the judicial process.
We come now to a chart that suggests the rough going ahead. It sets
forth the still substantial remainder of appeals whose disposition entails
much troubled inquiry as to which of several appropriate lines of precedent
should govern. I need not remind this audience that judges and lawyers
alike have an increasingly hard time extricating or developing legal principles from a welter of moth-eaten court decisions, misshapen statutes, and
self-propagating administrative regulations, amid which crested flycatchers
wing around to impale errors for scrutiny in legal journals.
The lawyer at least is free to assemble from the welter whatever best
serves his adversary brief in accord with his sense of the trend of precedent,
and often he develops that sense by specialization. The appellate judge,
however, is usually denied this luxury of specialization as he hears conflicting sides of a controversy. Too often he does not get the help he should
have had from the briefs. Too often knowledgeable counsel will press
specious issues to the disadvantage of a less skillful opponent unaware of
where his own strength lies or where lie the other's weaknesses. Too often
both sides set forth issues that float upon the surface of a problem and yield
no clue to the ones beneath. An element of chance then enters the solution, for even the most painstaking court may fail to uncover what the
adversaries failed to reveal.
Still, a court aware of this possibility learns to read closely between the
lines whenever they begin to look wobbly. As Professor Karl Llewellyn
has observed, "an appellate court in quest of justice can do (and often has
done) more reformulating of ill-drawn issues than is generally realized even
by lawyers." 1 When it must itself formulate the issues it then gives counsel an opportunity to submit new briefs, which they should not lightly disregard. "Here counsel's responsibility matches that of the court. Occasionally they dismiss a troubling question both orally and in the briefs. One
question, cavalierly dismissed by counsel as having nothing to do with the
case, proceeded from a theory that became the basis of the court's decision,
later sustained by the United States Supreme Court. 2 Fortunately for counsel
that theory saved their case; but the wages of indifference are not always so
munificent." 3
Apart from such homework on behalf of counsel to articulate the issues of
a controversy, an appellate judge still confronts his own homework. How can
he be sure that between counsel's efforts and his own all pertinent materials
have been rounded up? Suppose there lies undiscovered some pertinent statute
TRADrrION 29 (1960).
' Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal. 2d 835, 118 P.2d 1 (1941), aff'd sub nom. Hendry v.
Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
"Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. Cm. L.
REv. 211, 216 (1957).
' LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw
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still at large? Many a judge is haunted by the muddle that ensues when a
court overlooks such a statute even when it is in plain sight. Thus an 1898
case4 in our state involving a land-purchase contract overlooked a provision
against forfeiture in the Civil Code. It begat confusion for over fifty years, at
last dispelled in a series of cases ending in 1951.5 A judge in 1960 mindful
of the consequences of such an error of omission is understandably apprehensive of possible oversights that might beget like confusion until the year 2013
or longer.
Once he has marshalled the data pertinent to a controversy, he must
articulate a solution that calls for a discriminating sense of which available
principle, if any, should govern the case. His task is least complicated when
he can choose from among several principles that readily fit the case without
looking anachronistic. Thus, he may choose in a negligence case from among
several plausible alternative theories about a statutory standard of conduct
for criminal liability in relation to civil liability. One theory is that such a
standard cannot be invoked in civil cases since its very language refers only
to criminal liability. Another would invoke it on the premise that "when a
legislative body has generalized a standard from the experience of the community and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm, the court accepts
the formulated standards and applies them .

.

. except where they would

would serve to impose liability without fault." 6 A judge must first choose
between these theories. If he adopts the second, he must again make a choice
from among various applications of the statutory standard. He still has no
assurance that his will be the unanimous choice. Thus in a single case the
judges stated their separate views that the statutory standard for criminal
liability was the appropriate one for civil liability, that violation of the penal
statute created a rebuttable presumption of negligence, and finally that such
a violation was merely evidence of negligence.7 Selection there was for immediate decision embodying the rebuttable presumption view, but there is
nothing to guarantee it a life everlasting. The badland awaits further cultivation. It defies present full-scale cultivation precisely because it is not wild
enough. When there are no manifest signs indicating where growth might be
most fruitfully nurtured, who among us can prophesy what cultivation would
prove most farseeing? Who would dare predict how long the standard of a
criminal statute will have no greater force in a civil case than to create a
rebuttable presumption of negligence in the event of failure to observe it?
As the badlands get worse there are clearer indications of what form reclamation might take, though the need remains for judgment of the highest
order that combinations of analysis and intuition culminating in decisions
that time proves prophetic. There is not nearly enough reclamation in these
rough areas where judges must select from alternatives less felicitous than in
our first illustration. Sometimes the nearest pertinent lines of authority reduce
'Glock v. Howard &Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898).
'Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949); Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 2d 36,
216 P.2d 13 (1950); Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
*Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943).
'Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
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the choice to one that is either literal in the extreme or one imaginative
enough to disturb those nestling in the comfort of the formulas they learned
years ago and can still murmur automatically in their underdeveloped world
of categories. One can only guess at the limitations of mind or spirit that
would explain their refuge in ancient sheepskins and their disturbance that
something new has been added to the law antedating 1909 or 1929 or 1949 or
even 1959. Familiarity, alas, breeds undeserved respect. Any judge who has
ever rejected the extremely literal alternative for the reasonably imaginative
one knows the reaction it invokes from the defenders of "What has been .... "
They would command little attention were it not that they speak the appealing language of stability in justification of the neat formula. The trouble
is that the formula may encase notions that have never been cleaned and
pressed and might disintegrate if they were. We might not accept the
formula so readily were we to examine what lies beneath it. We would then
learn that its apologists are not defenders of stability as they profess but rationalizers of inertia." "When laziness and timidity yoke us to our duties," La
Rochefoucauld reminds us, "we often give virtue the credit for it." 9
There is unfortunately in most human beings more of laziness and timidity
than of industry and forthrightness. Whatever judicial inertia is evinced by a
hidebound decision is matched by the profession's indifference or timorous
acceptance. Thus formula survives by default. In some areas there is little
else visible. "When, as in conflict of laws, new cases not only fail to portend
future directions but also fail to respond to the facile theories of the past, the
need is all the greater for judicial imagination in decision bold enough to
reject already unrealistic rules, yet cautious enough not to make formulations
that reach too zealously into the future." 1o
In more familiar fields courts must also remain mindful that the continuity
of the law demands respect for the present and hence for the future as well
as for the past, as a slide from California illustrates. A few years ago our
court chose to invoke, not the literally applicable Statute of Frauds, but a
principle that lent itself to amplification for the case in hand," as perhaps
it might have for earlier cases. "[WI e confronted a situation wherein A conveyed real property to B in reliance on B's oral promise to hold in trust for
A. In a context that suggested a confidential relationship, B broke the promise. We had to reckon with a line of cases that denied the remedy of a constructive trust because there was no actual fraud or no confidential relationship. We had to reckon with the curious duality in our legal thinking that
enables us to see the actionable wrong of direct injury to another's property
and disables us from visualizing the consequences of breaking a promise as
to such property.
'See Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A.J. 357
(1925).
"LA ROCH-EFOUCAULD, MAXIMS, No. 169 (Kronenberger transl. 1959).
10Traynor, Comment on Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY
AND
TomORRow 57 (Columbia Law School Centennial Conference Volume 1959); see also Traynor,
Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 667 (1959).
n Orella v. Johnson, 38 Cal. 2d 693, 697, 242 P.2d 5, 7 (1952).
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"Our analysis, proceeding from that of scholars long preoccupied with this
duality, led us to the cases that afforded at least the remedy of specific restitution to those who had parted with purchase-money or rendered services in
reliance on an unenforceable oral promise to convey real property. From there
we advanced to the theory that one who himself conveys in reliance on an
oral promise of another to hold in trust can invoke specific restitution to preclude the unjust enrichment of the other, when the latter's course of conduct
has made plain his awareness that the property had been given him in trust."12
There are problems of judgment in determining where to place a case if
there are several alternative principles that would shelter it comfortably, as in
the illustration involving the application of a penal standard to a civil case.
The problems become more serious when, as in the illustration we have just
invoked, the choice lies between an uncomfortably narrow traditional shelter
and one expansive enough for the case but as yet untried, though within
easy reach.
Here is another slide of such badlands in the seemingly well-tended field
of contracts. The case for which we sought shelter involved a subcontractor's
bid to a contractor to do paving work for some 7,000 dollars.' 3 The contractor
relied thereon in drawing up his own bid, which was accepted. The subcontractor then revoked his bid and refused to do the paving for less than
15,000 dollars. The contractor, despite his best efforts to mitigate damages,
succeeded only in engaging another subcontractor to do the paving for nearly
11,000 dollars. He accordingly sued the first subcontractor for damages.
There was no evidence that the defendant offered to make his bid
irrevocable in consideration of plaintiff's using in the computation of his own
bid the figures that the defendant had submitted. Nor was it possible to find
a bilateral contract binding on both parties. The evidence indicated that it
was reasonable for plaintiff to rely on the defendant's bid and that he did not
delay accepting that bid after being awarded the general contract, in the hope
of getting a lower bid. Still, defendant had made no promise to hold his bid
open, though neither had he reserved the right to revoke.
This offer for a bilateral contract had much in common with an offer for
a unilateral contract. As to the latter, the theory had already developed that
"the main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if
part of the requested performance is given, the offeror will not revoke his
offer" and that the consideration rendering this implied promise enforceable
is the part performance.' 4 The theory implied that an offer emerges to the
point of no return as an enforceable quid for a given quo, even though the
parties themselves never literally struck a bargain. As with many another
construction in the law designed to preclude injustice, this theory of implied
promise is ingeniously contained within conventional terminology. Whatever
its orthodox language, this implication was contrived to give effect, not to a
considered bargain, but to the justifiable expectations of the parties. It thus
" Traynor, Unjustifiable Reliance, 42 MINN. L. REV. 11, 17 (1957).
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1933).
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tacitly opened the way for a shift in emphasis from the language of bargain
and consideration to the language of reliance as a basis for implying an enforceable subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer. The real significance of
part performance is not that it may be construed as consideration in the conventional bargain sense to render enforceable an implied promise but that it
can be identified realistically as one form of reliance.
Was it not then possible for other forms of justifiable reliance likewise to
call up an implied promise and render it enforceable? We advanced to the
analogy, in the offer for a bilateral contract such as the subcontractor's bid,
that reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change in position affords a compelling basis also for implying a subsidiary promise not to
revoke. We could not equate this form of reliance with bargained-for consideration as the reliance evinced by part performance had been equated. Thus
the issue resolved itself that plaintiff's reliance served to make the defendant's
offer irrevocable, even though there was no consideration "in the sense of something that is bargained for and given in exchange." 15 This solution combined
the theory of implied promise in section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts
with the theory of promissory estoppel set forth in section 90.
Our analysis leading to that decision brought us up sharply against the
question-begging word consideration, which labels so many disintegrating trees
along judicial trails, awaiting to give dubious shelter to contemporary cases.
We looked beyond them to the oaks from little peppercorns growing and
placed a contemporary case within the sheltering ambit of contemporary live
oaks. Once again, time had compelled us to consider what we mean when we
speak of consideration. We could understand why Professor Arthur Corbin,
the great scholar of contracts, concluded that: "the reasons for enforcing
informal promises are many, that the doctrine of consideration is many doctrines, that no definition can rightly be set up as the one and only correct
definition, and that the law of contract is an evolutionary product that has
changed with time and circumstance and that must ever continue so to
change." 1"

Thoughtful lawyers, aware from experience of how swiftly the pace of
communications has accelerated, no doubt tacitly share this view. Judges too
are bound to have learned from the cases that there has been evolution in the
law of contracts as in other law, the stir of subterranean growth that will push
through ground that has been well tended.
There is ground, however, that has been eccentrically tended and new
growth does not come through to displace the superannuated. What of the
badlands where evolution has taken a turn for the worse in a disintegrating
precedent that few dare to call anything but stare decisis, lest any other name
sound disrespectful. A typical slide might show a decaying stump or rocky
debris along a judicial trail, at odds with weathered signs that exhort:
Take thought for those who come after you and remove all debris.
By Order of Reason.
See 1 CORBIN,

634 (1950).
162 (1 voL ed. 1952).

CONTRACTS

"CORBIN, CONTRACTs
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The encumbrance remains, perhaps because of other signs bearing the injunction:
Halt. Proceed no further unless you can do so without disturbing the relics.
Society for the Preservation of Bygones.
Stare decisis, to stand by decided cases, conjures up another phrase dear
to Latin lovers - stare super antiquas vias, to stand on the old paths. One
might feel easier about the word stare if itself it stood by one fixed-star of
meaning. In modern Italian stare means to stay, to stand, to lie, or to sit, to
remain, to keep, to stop, or to wait. With delightful flexibility it also means
to depend, to fit or to suit, to live, and, of course, to be.
Legal minds at work on this word might well conjecture that to stare or
not to stare depends on whether decisis is dead or alive. We might inquire
into the life of what we are asked to stand by. In the language of stare
decisers: Primo, should it ever have been born? Secundo, is it still alive?
Tertio, does it now deserve to live? As you see, we are now getting ourselves
in deep in the realm of reason, and the badlands were never worse. Let us
respond to these questions seriatim, and of course seriously, with other questions. Who among us has not known a precedent that should never have been
born? What counsel does not know a precedent worn so thin and pale with
distinctions that the court has never troubled to overrule it? How many a
counsel, accordingly misled, has heard the court then pronounce that the
precedent must be deemed to have revealed itself as overruled sub silentio
and ruminated in bewilderment that the precedent on which he relied was
never expressly overruled because it so patently needed to be? Vho among
us does not know a precedent that has had a good life in its day but whose day
is over?
In truth, we are hardly such innocent bystanders as we sound when we
speak the language of stare decisis. We know very well that not every past
case is a very present help in trouble. The notion yet persists that the overruling of ill-conceived, or moribund, or obsolete precedents somehow menaces
the stability of the lawv. It is as if we would not remove barriers on a highway
because everyone had become accustomed to circumventing them, and hence
traffic moved, however awkwardly. The implication is that one cannot render
traffic conditions efficient without courting dangers from the disturbance of
established habit patterns. We have reached such a pass, we are wont to
say, that it is for the legislature and not the court to set matters aright. No
one says it more than the courts themselves.
I am puzzled about how we have arrived at this cliche. One speculation
is that the popular image of the legislature as the lawmaking body, in cone
junction with a popular notion of contemporary judges as primarily the maintenance men of the law, has engendered an auxiliary notion that whatever
incidental law courts create they are bound to maintain unless the legislature
undertakes to unmake it.
One can speculate further that the occupational caution of judges makes
them reluctant to take the initiative in overruling a precedent whose unworthi-
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ness is concealed in the aura of stare decisis. It takes boldness to turn a flashlight upon an aura and call out what one has seen, at the risk of violating
quiet for the benefit of those who have retired from active thought. It is easier
for a court to rationalize that less shock will result if it bides its time, and bides
it and bides it, the while it awaits legislative action to transfer an unfortunate
precedent unceremoniously to the dump from the fading glory in which it has
been basking. Such judicial passivity sets in train real dangers to the stability of
the law. We might better concern ourselves with them than with the illusory
dangers of timely overruling. "If the court adheres to stare decisis, as it is wont
to do, with an aloof statement that the question is one for the legislature - although it is one created by judicial decision - it creates not only a new halo for
the old rule but a precedent that it is not within the province of the court to
make a change. Thus doubly haloed the rule becomes judicially untouchable.
. . . The fading letters of the old precedent have been newly and sharply engraved for the headnotes." '7
There is little assurance that legislatures will undertake responsibility for
the continuing revision of the common law the courts abandon even though it
is rightly theirs. This reluctance of courts to depart from stare decisis, their
concern not to invade the province of the legislature, their soporific view that
they can abandon their own responsibility because legislative action is
theoretically available to correct judicial error, all combine to perpetuate recurring grotesqueries in the evolution of the law.
Fortunately, all is not saved. We come now to more cheerful slides illustrating that courts now and again do clear a trail for those who come after
them. "They have significantly expanded the concept of obligation. They
are recognizing a much needed right to privacy.' 8 They are recognizing a right
to recovery for prenatal injuries" and intentionally inflicted mental suffering. 20
They are recognizing the right of one member of the family to recover against
another. 2 ' They are recognizing liability once precluded by charitable 2 2 or
governmental immunities. 23 The now general acceptance of the manufacturer's liability to third persons for negligence has stimulated inquiry into
appropriate bases for possible strict liability for injuries resulting from defective
products.2 4 The courts are moving closer to open preoccupation with compensation for personal injuries, which is bound in turn to augment the scope of
insurance." 25
" Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 240.
*See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALuF. L. REv. 383 (1960).
19 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Silizinoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
* Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
" 2Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal.
2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939).
" Molitor v. Kaneland Community District, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); see Guidi
v. State, 41 Cal. 2d 623, 262 P.2d 3 (1953).
" Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1960); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 523, 203 P.2d
522, 528 (1949) (concurring opinion); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461,
150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
" Traynor, supra note 10, at 55.
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Most thinking lawyers and laymen now agree in the abstract that the common law today is not what it used to be or what it will be in the future.
Nevertheless the excessive tolerance we all tend to develop for the familiar,
even for an atrocity grown familiar, precludes our lending ready encouragement to any change for the better. Intellectually we subscribe to improvement,
but when it materializes it is a jolt to our customary ways, and we are likely
to cancel our subscription. A judge concerned with the orderly development
of the law, but aware that it must proceed slowly enough for the community
to absorb it, is thus inclined to proceed far more cautiously in ridding the
law of an anachronism than does a formulistic judge in reinforcing its defenses. He must be prepared as is a mountain guide to bring to his task more
thought and skill than is demanded of the rocker in a rocking chair.
First of all he must explain why rocking-chair reflections are no longer
tolerable. It might behoove him, for example, to explain in simple language
how cumbersome it has become to pretend, as we have since 1787, that ancient crones can still have babies, 26 particularly when the commonplace sight
of expectant mothers in toreador pants reinforces the non-legal presumption
that a delicate condition is not for octogenarians. Many a judge, however
bold enough to destroy the illusion that any woman may be a mother has
reckoned with the shock, if not the disapproval, that such a destruction engenders and has thought twice before making so bold.
Likewise it might behoove a judge, whatever the repercussions, to explain
in simple language that we should no longer pretend that any man may be a
father, despite scientifically conclusive blood tests to the contrary." Flattering
as it may be to a woman to be regarded as able to bear a child though she
cannot, it can only be disquieting to a man to be pronounced the father
of a child though he is not. Yet judges have resisted the shattering scientific
evidence and continued to rock within the comfortable four corners of established law. We are well aware that courts not only do not advance beyond the customs and beliefs of the community but traditionally lag behind
them. When, however, the lag reaches such proportions as in the last two
illustrations, it is time for judges to rouse themselves from their own inertia
and bring themselves a century or two closer to the community.
A judge needs no more than forthrightness to make an overdue statement
of the obvious. He may be deterred, however, by the prospect of also having
to explain why it was not always so obvious, or if it was why it failed of
earlier recognition. Never forget that his explanation must persuade his colleagues, make sense to the bar, pass muster with the scholars, and if possible
allay the suspicion of any man in the street who regards knowledge of the law
as no excuse for making it. It is understandable when a judge faced with
running such a gamut marks time instead on the line of least resistance and
lets bad enough alone.
The brutal fact remains that we cannot afford to let bad enough alone, if
indeed we ever could even in simpler times. We must bring to the judicial
"Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787).
Arais v. Kalensniko, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 431-34, 74 P.2d 1043, 1045-47 (1937); Berry v.
Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946) (overridden by statute, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE, §§ 1980.1-80.7). See Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657 (Cal. 1960).
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realm of reason research and development comparable to that now going on
in the realm of public and private enterprise. The time now comes to rephrase
the subject of our travelogue as a question: What can we do to reclaim the
badlands?
The question is of crucial importance because judges are uniquely situated
to articulate timely rules of reason. Their freedom from political and personal
pressures and from adversary bias, together with the long history of high public
service in the judiciary, affords them an environment for work as independent
and analytically objective as that of any legal scholars. Cumulative experience
with a variety of controversies tends to impart a humanity to their scholarship that is sometimes worth more than the academic meticulousness of a
scholarly specialist not responsible for decision. Above all, a long tradition of
open hearings, and a long evolution of procedures that respect and protect the
individual, impel judges to disclose the reasons for their decisions.
Such independence, humanity, and responsibility for full disclosure have
served well enough in the past to establish many principles that have rendered
the common law reasonably coherent without hampering its growth. The
many fertile fields in the realm of reason, however, can no longer absolve the
courts from the responsibility of reclaiming the badlands. The task requires
no elaborate new machinery. It requires that appellate courts take the initiative in needed cultivation. It requires also that we rid ourselves of the superstitution that once the courts have allowed a precedent to live beyond its time
they are bound to continue its social security indefinitely unless an impatient
legislature steps in to decree otherwise. Such superstition invites two hazards.
One is that the legislators will never rush to the execution. The other is
that they will.
We are given to justifying our tolerance for anachronistic precedents by
rationalizing that they have engendered so much reliance as to preclude their
liquidation. Sometimes, however, we assume reliance when in fact it has been
dissipated by the patent weakness of the precedent. Those who plead reliance
do not necessarily practice it. Thus a company that had sold liability insurance to a state agency pleaded the sovereign immunity doctrine; on questioning, however, it appeared that the agency had insured itself in awareness
of the growing limitations on the doctrine as set forth in a case decided in
1898.28

A dilemma does arise in the occasional situation where there has been
substantial reliance on a precedent that the court now finds unsound. It has
three ways out. It can stand by the unsound precedent. It can make an overruling that is retroactive, a solution that works hardship on the party that
relied but assures the winning party the benefit of what the court now declares
to be the law. It can invoke the solution approved in Great Northern Ry. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 29 applying the old precedent, but giving warning that the court will not apply it to transactions entered into henceforth.
This solution protects the party that relied but makes the losing party subject
to a precedent now declared unsound. The fairy tale persists that the court
G
Guidi v. State, 41 Cal. 2d 623, 262 P.2d 3 (1953).
*287 U.S. 358 (1932).
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does not make the law but merely declares what it has always been and that
an overruling decision must hence be retroactive. Realistically, the choice
between the second and third solutions turns not on such mysticism but on
whether or not the hardship of defeating the reliance of one party would
outweigh the hardship of subjecting the other to a precedent unfit to survive.
The Sunburst solution is appropriate not only to precedents involving the
common law but also to those involving statutory or even constitutional interpretation. Our court accordingly declared in a recent case involving the
taxation of a lessee's possessory interest in tax-exempt government land that
it could apply an overruling decision prospectively only, even though the
precedent it thereby temporarily preserved was one that embodied a mistaken
interpretation of the constitution. Moreover, we recognized that the legislature can also invoke the Sunburst solution by statute when it is called upon
to balance the hardships in terms of fairness and public policy.30
There is bound to be such occasional overlapping as in this area of taxation. Nevertheless in the large domain of the common law, courts can do
much to insure an efficient division of labor by fulfilling their own responsibilities. Theirs is the task, as Professor Henry Hart has noted, "of keeping the
underlying body of the unwritten general law alive and growing, and not only
rationally consistent within itself but rationally related to the purposes which
the social order exists to serve. Basic to the successful performance of this
task is the development of an adequate conception of stare decisis and its
limitations so as to free the legislature from avoidable pressure to replace the
unwritten law with law which is cast in the more rigid and often less desirable
form of an enactment."> a3 A legislature should be under little pressure to do
so when a court has exerted itself to clarify the law intelligently.
In the quite different area of cases involving federal questions, a state
appellate court can also do much for the orderly development of law by
articulating the issues and setting forth clearly the reasons for its decision.
That responsibility is the greater when there appears to be no controlling case
or even clear trend in the pertinent federal authorities that would afford a
basis for predicting how the United States Supreme Court will decide in the
event of an appeal or petition for certiorari. That Court, likewise without the
advantage of clear authority, would then at least have the benefit of the state
court's fully deliberated opinion.
A special problem arises when an authoritative United States Supreme
Court case appears to have so lost its authority as to be ripe for a decision
expressly overruling it. Confronted with such a case a state court must verify
with painstaking care the signs that it is moribund. If it is, and only the official
death notice remains to be pronounced, a state court may reason that it is
wiser though substantially more difficult to administer appropriate last rites
than to pretend a case is still alive that is about to be pronounced dead. 2
'Forster Ship Building Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 353 P.2d 736, 741 (Cal. 1960).
" Hart, Comment on Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMOR.
ROW 42, 43 (Columbia Law School Centennial Volume 1959).
' See e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 725-38, 242 P.2d 617, 623-24 (1952);
Intagliata v. Shipowners & Mer. Etc. Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945). Cf. People v.
Oyama, 29 Cal. 2d 164, 181, 173 P.2d 793, 804 (1946).
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Our travelogue now draws to a close with a brief movie of a phenomenon
extant throughout the whole realm. Look closely as the film unrolls and you
will see that the realm is crawling with facts. Look closer still and you will
observe that there are always a few of them undergoing what the Greeks had
a word for, mitosis. In this mitosis, however, the split segments come together
again to form, not an angular new cell of fact, but a moon-shaped cell of law
and fact.
Now the first thing an appellate judge hears upon entering the realm is that
if it's a fact, it's a fact, 3 3 and hence not for him to question. As he looks all
around him, he becomes troubled that here and there he is apparently seeing
double. Once he verifies that what he sees actually is double, it is of little reassurance to him that lawyers have a Greek word for it, dichotomy. He recalls
that the word is sometimes defined as that phase of the moon in which half
of its apparently flat surface seems to be illuminated. He notes that neither half
seems to be well-illuminated when he picks up one of these little dichotomies
to puzzle out whether it is law or fact that makes it tick. Instead of two
literal halves of which but one is illuminated, he perceives an indivisible surface. Sometimes it is all illuminated. More often it is all obscure, or worse,
all distractingly half-lit.
There is nevertheless a customary saying in the realm that an appellate
judge ordinarily reviews questions of law but not of fact, implying an arbitrary
line between them. There is all too little inquiry into the recurring overlap
of law and fact in the classifications we now make, sometimes allocating questions of law to the trier of fact on the pretense they are questions of fact, and
sometimes questions of fact to the court on the pretense they are questions
of law. Thus we leave to the jury the determination of what is reasonable care
even though it must formulate a standard therefor and hence make law ad hoc.
On the other hand, courts generally determine what factually existed or occurred when there is no conflict in the evidence. However expedient such
allocation may be, it does not insure an infallible differentiation between the
so-called law that is open on appeal and the so-called facts that are not. That,
however, is the subject of another travelogue.3 4
We cannot expect courts to fulfill their many responsibilities except with
a wholehearted support of the profession that goes beyond the present abundant and often valuable criticism of decisions in legal journals. Certainly we
want to maintain an environment in which an opinion is open to inspection by
"scholars and practitioners on the alert to note any misunderstanding of the
problem, any error in reasoning, any irrelevance in data, any premature cartography beyond the problem at hand.""* Sometimes these criticisms are
heeded as are signals from a distance by judges who have developed on the
job some sense, however unspecialized, of the size and shape of their realm of
reason. These signals, however, afford only token one-way communication, intermittent monologues of decision, criticism, criticism, decision. In such an
See Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1958).
" See Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.
Cm. L. REV. 211, 220-224 (1957); supra note 33, at 635.
" Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND
TomoRRow 52 (Columbia Law School Centennial Volume 1959).
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inefficient system there is a tragic waste of the resources of scholarship, a tragic
failure to make optimum use of the judicial process. There could be constructive dialogue between scholars and decision-makers in the public interest,
and if there were no one would benefit more than practicing lawyers. There is
no reason why courts should not request in complicated cases the disinterested
expert opinion of scholars, whether in law schools or law offices. It should be
possible for the state to provide for at least the printing of their briefs, and
perhaps also modest compensation. They could appear as amici curiae so that
all members of the court and counsel for the parties would have the benefit of
their views and the opportunity to present questions to them. We might well
develop a tradition of regarding such public service as one of the most honorable
responsibilities of the profession.
Meanwhile we might give more thought to the nature and objectives of law
revision commissions. The problems that lie ahead are bound to present them
with many opportunities for constructive teamwork with law schools in continuing law revision of the highest order.
One comes to have a deep sense of obligation to the land one traverses day
after day. It may never be entirely free from blight. Yet we who see it respond
to even the most casual reclamation, find it possible to envisage it as the ideal
realm it could be. And so I was envisaging it here, as we must who have undertaken to work in the realm of reason.

